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At the midnight premiere of the latest Batman movie on Friday,
July 20, 2012, in Aurora, Colorado, James Holmes "tossed two
hissing gas canisters and calmly walked up the aisle firing at movie-
goers, killing 12 and wounding 58."l Some called almost
immediately for reinstatement of the ban on assault weapons and
high-capacity magazines. 2 President Obama hinted in that direction
but called instead for better enforcement of existing gun laws and
keeping guns out of the hands of the mentally ill.3 Although all of
Holmes's guns were obtained legally,4 he was apparently seeing a
psychiatrist before the shooting.5
The politics of gun control are complicated. The Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence and the National Rifle
Association ("NRA") are generally on opposite sides of gun policy
debates.6 After the Virginia Tech massacre,7 however, the NRA
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1. Karen E. Crummy & Jordan Steffen, A Calculated Plan: Apartment
Rigged with Deadly Traps, DENVER PoST, July 22, 2012, at 1A; Op-Ed., Restrict
Access to Mass Killing Tools, DENVER POST, July 24, 2012, at 21A.
2. Restrict Access to Mass Killing Tools, supra note 1.
3. Amy Gardner & Philip Rucker, President Promises More Action on
Guns, WASH. POST, July 26, 2012, at A04.
4. Restrict Access to Mass Killing Tools, supra note 1.
5. Karen E. Crummy & Jeremy P. Meyer, Suspect Saw Psychiatrist,
DENVER POST, July 28, 2012, at 1A.
6. Press Release, Dan Gross, President, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun
Violence, Brady Campaign Statement on the NRA's Defense of Dangerous
"Shoot First" Laws (May 2, 2012), available at http://www.bradycampaign.org
/media/press/view/1495/.
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actually worked with the Brady Campaign on a bill encouraging
states to submit records of the dangerously mentally ill for
background checks.8
This temporary alignment of strange bedfellows and Obama's
response to the movie massacre are undoubtedly derived from the
strong public perception that the mentally ill are dangerous to
others.9  High-profile killings certainly fuel that perception: in
addition to Virginia Tech and Aurora, consider Jared Loughner and
John Hinckley, both of whom attempted to assassinate prominent
politicians. Fear was also the motivation for the current federal law
prohibiting firearm possession by certain mentally ill individuals.10
And it would be hard to conclude that the perception of danger did
not contribute to the United States Supreme Court's recent dictum
to the effect that such laws do not violate the Second Amendment."
In fact, the vast majority of mentally ill individuals will not be
violent toward others, and large subsets do not even pose an
increased risk. The risk of suicide, on the other hand, is
substantially elevated for nearly every diagnosis. Mental illness
likely played a role in the gun suicides of Junior Seau,12 Kurt
Cobain,13 Ernest Hemingway, 14 and Vincent van Gogh. 15 Current
restrictions on gun ownership by the mentally ill would rest on
much stronger constitutional footing if based on preventing suicide
7. See Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/v/virginia
polytechnic institute-and state university/index.html (last updated Mar. 14,
2012).
8. Editorial, One Gun Bill Too Many, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at A42.
What happened to the fragile truce? "After the bill became law in 2008, the
N.R.A. began lobbying state lawmakers to keep requirements for petitioners
[seeking a restoration of gun rights after disqualification for mental illness] to a
minimum." Michael Luo, Mixing Guns and Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2011, at Al.
9. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels,
Causes, Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1332
(1999).
10. Clare Priest, Note, When a Stopgap Measure Triggers a Permanent
Proscription: The Interpretation of "Committed to a Mental Institution" in the
Gun Control Act of 1968, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 369 (2002).
11. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
12. Sam Farmer, Junior Seau Had Brain Disease When He Committed
Suicide, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la
-sp-sn-junior-seau-brain-20130110,0,5469494.story.
13. Alan Berman, An Idiographic Approach to Understanding Suicide in
the Young, in SUICIDE IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 198, 200-01 (Robert A.
King & Alan Apter eds., 2003).
14. NANCY J. OSGOOD, SUICIDE IN LATER LIFE: RECOGNIZING THE WARNING
SIGNS 1-2 (1992).
15. Dietrich Blumer, The Illness of Vincent van Gogh, 159 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 519, 520-22 (2002).
2 [Vol. 48
A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
rather than violence toward others.16 Of course, this assumes that
the mentally ill have some right, however limited, to bear arms.
The Supreme Court's dictum is the starting point for answering
the title question: Does the Second Amendment protect the mentally
ill?17 Part I considers several possible interpretations of the dictum.
One reading is that the mentally ill simply fall outside the scope of
the Second Amendment and have no right to bear arms. All but one
federal circuit court of appeals have strongly suggested that they
would take this approach.18 This reading is unsatisfactory, as
explained below. The Seventh Circuit would apparently apply
intermediate scrutiny.19 State courts interpreting their own
constitutions have adopted a less exacting standard:
reasonableness. 20 Finally, some commentators and courts have
advocated hybrid or other unorthodox approaches. 21
Rather than arguing for the adoption of one approach or
another, the balance of this Article examines whether existing gun
laws restricting the right of the mentally ill to possess firearms are
constitutional under three possible approaches: (1) reasonableness;
(2) intermediate scrutiny; and (3) hybrid or other.
The first goal of this Article is to assess what is at stake when
selecting a level of scrutiny. The second, and perhaps more
important, goal is to illuminate a hidden and flawed assumption of
current gun policy. Even if we have the right laws, it may be for the
wrong reasons. Subpart II.A begins by outlining current laws
restricting gun possession by the mentally ill. There is a continuum
from the federal law disallowing possession primarily by those who
have been involuntarily committed to a few states' laws banning
possession by anyone merely diagnosed as mentally ill.
All three standards require consideration of the government
interest justifying regulation, as explained in Subpart II.B.
16. Professor David Williams has suggested that suicide prevention is a
stronger rationale for gun regulation than violence prevention. David C.
Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of Guns,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 657 (2008).
17. Note that the question is descriptive, not normative. This Article does
not answer the question of how the Constitution should be interpreted or the
question of whether restrictions on firearm possession by the mentally ill are
good policy. On the latter, see, for example, Paul S. Appelbaum & Jeffrey
Swanson, Gun Laws and Mental Illness: How Sensible Are the Current
Restrictions?, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 652, 652 (2010); Lawrence 0. Gostin &
Katherine L. Record, Dangerous People or Dangerous Weapons: Access to
Firearms for Persons with Mental Illness, 305 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2108, 2108
(2011). For purposes of this Article, individuals with substance abuse disorder
and no other comorbid mental illness are not considered "mentally ill."
18. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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Preventing gun accidents, violence, and suicides are the relevant
interests. There is little question that these interests are
sufficiently important-rather, the issue is whether the fit between
the interests and current gun laws is sufficiently tight to pass
constitutional muster. There is a substantial amount of evidence
regarding the relationship between mental illness and violence and
suicide. Under the reasonableness approach, all current gun laws
are very likely constitutional. Under intermediate scrutiny, only
targeted restrictions are justified by the goal of preventing harm to
others. On the other hand, preventing suicide is likely a sufficient
constitutional justification for sweeping prohibitions. The most
exacting, third approach considered here would invalidate all such
laws. Almost everything turns on the level of scrutiny.
This examination of laws prohibiting gun possession by the
mentally ill reveals hidden tensions beneath a "consensus" issue.
Such laws pit civil liberties against civil rights-more specifically,
the right to bear arms against the rights of the mentally ill not to be
discriminated against. A second tension is fear versus reality.
Contrary to popular misconceptions, the mentally ill are far more
dangerous to themselves than to others. 22 If the government wants
to robustly regulate their gun rights, it may have to embrace
paternalism.
I. DELINEATING THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
A. What Heller Says
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed."23  The path-marking case is the United States
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.24
After an extensive analysis of the history of the Second Amendment,
the Court struck down a total ban on handgun possession in the
home, as well as a requirement to maintain other firearms either
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock. 2 5
History was at the heart of the Heller opinion. In its historical
exegesis, the Court stated and implied multiple times that all
Americans have a right to bear arms:
What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution
that mention "the people," the term unambiguously refers to
22. See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
23. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. II).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 628-30.
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all members of the political community, not an unspecified
subset. 26
We start therefore with a strong presumption that the Second
Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all
Americans. 27
"Keep arms" was simply a common way of referring to
possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone else.28
From this language it would seem clear that the mentally ill, like all
other Americans, have a right to bear arms.
But the Court in dictum suggested otherwise: "[N]othing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill."29 A
footnote described these prohibitions as examples of "presumptively
lawful regulatory measures."30
How should one reconcile these crosscurrents in Heller?31
B. What Heller Does Not Mean
Start with the most expansive view of gun rights for the
mentally ill. First, one could simply ignore the dictum and conclude
that the mentally ill have precisely the same Second Amendment
rights as other Americans. Dicta are dicta and not controlling.32
But lower federal courts fear reversal and take the Supreme Court's
"considered dicta" quite seriously.33 One commentator has gone so
26. Id. at 580.
27. Id. at 581.
28. Id. at 583; see also id. at 583 n.7 (referencing "[tihe right of every
individual to keep arms for his defence. . ." (quoting WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER,
OUTLINES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 31-32
(1833))); id. at 585 n.8 ("Every citizen has a right to bear arms . . . ." (quoting
ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 17; Miss. CONST.
of 1817, art. I, § 23)).
29. Id. at 626.
30. Id. at 627 n.26.
31. The Court had a chance to answer this question in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality opinion) but chose instead
merely to apply Heller against the states and to reiterate the enigmatic dicta.
32. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821) ("It is a maxim
not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they
go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.").
33. United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) ("We are
bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by the
Court's outright holdings, particularly when .. . a dictum is of recent vintage
and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement." (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
far as to describe these as "dicta of the strongest sort."34 Ignoring
them does not seem a viable option.
A second approach would focus on the "presumptively lawful"
language. A minimalist reading of this phrase is that restrictions on
the gun rights of the mentally ill will be presumed constitutional in
the same way practically all other legislation is. 35 Nothing in the
Heller opinion casts doubt on such restrictions because they were
not at issue, and the presumption of constitutionality survives. This
argument is too clever by half. Recognizing an individual right to
bear arms obviously casts doubt on-even if it does not
automatically invalidate-restrictions on gun ownership. So when
the Court says its opinion casts no doubt, it is sending a signal
regarding the merits of mental illness gun restrictions. 36
Skipping for a moment over more complicated middle ground,
the third approach would be simply to rely upon the dictum to
uphold existing restrictions on gun possession by the mentally ill.37
All three lower courts to address the question squarely have,
without analysis, done precisely this.38 All but one court of appeals
have similarly followed the Heller dicta in upholding felon-in-
possession laws. 39
34. Carlton F. W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009).
35. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 465 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting)
("Laws enacted by the state legislatures are presumptively constitutional. . . .");
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (applying a "presumption of
constitutionality" to acts of Congress). But cf. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) ("Accordingly, when we are reviewing
statutes which deny some residents the right to vote, the general presumption
of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional approval given
state classifications if the Court can conceive of a 'rational basis' for the
distinctions made are not applicable.").
36. Essentially the same could be said of another possible limiting
construction: the Court was strongly suggesting that such restrictions are
facially valid, but subject to as-applied challenges. The as-applied challenges
are strengthened, indeed created, by the recognition of an individual right to
bear arms. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 & n.26
(2008).
37. Jason Racine, Note, What the Hell[er]? The Fine Print Standard of
Review Under Heller, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 605, 621 (2009) ("The more plausible
inference would be that the Court intended to assert that felons and the
mentally ill are not protected under the Second Amendment.").
38. United States v. McRobie, No. 08-4632, 2009 WL 82715, at *1 (4th Cir.
Jan. 14, 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Murphy, 681 F. Supp. 2d 95, 103
(D. Me. 2010); United States v. Roy, 742 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Me. 2010).
39. United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 316-19 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 112-13 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d
581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir.
2010); United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rozier,
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One problem with this approach is that the ban on gun
possession by the mentally ill is not "longstanding," at least not in
the constitutionally relevant sense of pre-dating adoption of the
Second or Fourteenth Amendments.40 It is true that justices of the
peace traditionally had the greater power to confine individuals with
dangerous mental impairments, but there is no historical basis for
deprivation of gun rights after release.41
A second defect is that this reading of Heller arguably drops the
word "presumptively" from the phrase "presumptively lawful." If
the mentally ill were categorically excluded from Second
Amendment protection, then restrictions on their gun rights would
be simply "lawful," not "presumptively" so.
Finally, this approach would seem to jettison Heller's soaring
rhetoric about the rights of all citizens. This last objection is the
weakest because the above-quoted passages from Heller appeared in
the course of rejecting the argument that the right to bear arms was
limited to militia members, not that it applied equally across all
other divides. The other two objections, however, should be decisive.
The mentally ill have a right to bear arms.
C. What Heller Might Mean
A more attractive, fourth alternative would be to adopt a brand
of scrutiny that would likely validate mental illness restrictions.
This would arguably give meaning to both words in the phrase
"presumptively lawful."42  The Heller majority did not adopt a
specific level of scrutiny for evaluating gun restrictions but
expressly rejected the rational-basis test.43  In dissent, Justice
Breyer argued that the majority also implicitly rejected strict
scrutiny by listing as presumptively valid restrictions that would
likely fail that high hurdle. 44 Notably, Justice Breyer omitted
mental illness restrictions from his list, suggesting that some of
these could survive strict scrutiny.45  But because the felon
598 F.3d 768, 770-71 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Stuckey,
317 F. App'x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037,
1047 (10th Cir. 2009).
40. Larson, supra note 34, at 1376 ("One searches in vain through
eighteenth-century records to find any laws specifically excluding the mentally
ill from firearms ownership. Such laws seem to have originated in the twentieth
century.").
41. Id. at 1376-78.
42. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010).
43. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
44. Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. (explaining that strict
scrutiny would require that a restriction be "narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest").
45. Accord Larson, supra note 34, at 1383 ("[A]1though this exception, if
focused on a specific subset of the mentally ill, would probably be upheld under
2013]1 7
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
exception, paired with mental illness by Heller, is almost certainly
not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest,46 strict scrutiny
cannot be the relevant test.47 That leaves several other options.
Professor Carlton Larson narrows the candidates to three: (1)
reasonableness, 48 (2) intermediate scrutiny, and (3) some hybrid. 49
1. Reasonableness
Is there support for "reasonableness" review? Professors
Laurence Tribe and Akhil Amar have endorsed this view.50
Professor Adam Winkler has shown that state courts interpreting
their constitutions have uniformly adopted a reasonableness
approach: "[A]ny law that is a 'reasonable regulation' of the arms
right is constitutionally permissible."5' This standard may be more
exacting than rational basis review, 52 but only slightly.5 3 In effect,
strict scrutiny, it is by no means a clear-cut case, and a broader law would
almost certainly fail.").
46. Id. at 1382 ("It is ... implausible to claim that an across-the-board
exclusion for all felons from this one particular constitutional right can be
justified as narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny."). Nor is it consistent with
history, according to another commentator. C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't
Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695, 698 (2009).
47. Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations
After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1156-57, 1157 n.227 (2011).
48. One commentator has argued that McDonald rejected the
reasonableness standard. Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty:
What's a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 502
(2012). It did not. It merely rejected the argument that state and local
governments were the arbiter of reasonableness. McDonald v. City of Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (plurality opinion) ("Municipal respondents
therefore urge us to allow state and local governments to enact any gun control
law that they deem to be reasonable. .. ."). Indeed, the same opinion went on
to cite favorably the amicus position that "[s]tate and local experimentation
with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second
Amendment." Id. (citation omitted).
49. Larson, supra note 34, at 1380.
50. See Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed., Well-Regulated
Militias, and More, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31 ("The right to bear arms is
certainly subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of public safety.").
51. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV.
683, 686-87 (2007).
52. Id. at 717; see also Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 795 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Gould, J., concurring); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State
Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 380-84 (2011).
53. Winkler, supra note 51, at 687 ("Since World War II, state courts have
authored hundreds of opinions using this test to determine the constitutionality
of all sorts of gun control laws. All but a tiny fraction of these decisions uphold
the challenged gun control laws as reasonable measures to protect public
safety."). But see Robert A. Levy, Second Amendment Redux: Scrutiny,
Incorporation, and the Heller Paradox, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 207
(2010) (suggesting that state court review has been less deferential than
claimed).
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courts ask, with a healthy dose of deference, whether the legislature
has struck a reasonable "balance between safety and weapons."54
Courts will hold unconstitutional a gun control law (or its
application to a particular individual) only in extreme
circumstances where (a) the law or its application is so
profoundly unfair as to be arbitrary and irrational, or (b) the
law or its application is so restrictive as to be effectively a
destruction or nullification of the right.55
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny would require that a restriction upon the
gun rights of the mentally ill would have to be substantially related
to an important government objective.56 At least one commentator
has advocated,5 7 and several district courts have adopted,5 8 this
approach.
The Seventh Circuit as well has adopted intermediate scrutiny.
In United States v. Skoien,59 an en banc panel upheld a statute
prohibiting firearm possession by an individual with two convictions
for "misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence."60  The court
expressly applied intermediate scrutiny.61 One might distinguish
misdemeanants from felons and the mentally ill on the ground that
Heller did not mention them, but the Seventh Circuit in Skoien
rejected that distinction. 62 Any doubt as to that conclusion was
54. Winkler, supra note 51, at 713; accord id. at 717-18.
55. Id. at 723.
56. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
57. Kiehl, supra note 47, at 1133 ("This Comment will then argue that
courts should apply intermediate scrutiny in evaluating gun regulations that
are short of absolute bans on possession, and that prohibitions on carrying
weapons do not implicate the core constitutional right identified in Heller and
McDonald of possessing a gun in the home for self-defense."). This approach is
arguably "hybrid." See infra Part I.C.3. Professor Brannon Denning agrees
that Heller adopted "at least" intermediate scrutiny. Brannon P. Denning, The
New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v.
Heller, 75 TENN. L. REv. 789, 799 (2008).
58. The cases are in the felon-in-possession context. United States v.
Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (citing United States v.
Radencich, No. 3:08-CR-00048(01)RM, 2009 WL 127648, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan.
20, 2009); United States v. Schultz, No. 1:08-CR-75-TS, 2009 WL 35225, at *5
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009); United States v. Bledsoe, No. SA-08-CR-13(2)-XR, 2008
WL 3538717, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008)).
59. 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
60. Id. at 639 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006)).
61. Id. at 641-42.
62. Id. at 640 ("The language we have quoted warns readers not to treat
Heller as containing broader holdings than the Court set out to establish: that
the Second Amendment creates individual rights, one of which is keeping
operable handguns at home for self-defense. What other entitlements the
2013] 9
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removed just weeks later, when a Seventh Circuit panel applied
intermediate scrutiny to a felon-in-possession ban.63
3. Hybrid
The universe of "hybrid" approaches is potentially limitless, so
this Article summarizes just two with substantial scholarly support.
First, in a relatively straightforward hybrid of intermediate and
strict scrutiny, Professor Calvin Massey argues that material
infringements on the right to bear arms should be upheld only if
they are substantially related to a compelling government purpose.64
Several lower federal courts have similarly adopted or suggested a
threshold burden on gun rights before heightened scrutiny need be
applied. 65 This approach may be attractive, but it can be set to one
side for present purposes. It is indistinguishable from intermediate
scrutiny in this context: an absolute prohibition on gun possession is
plainly material and sufficiently burdensome to trigger heightened
scrutiny, and the government objectives of preventing gun deaths
and injuries are plainly compelling, not merely important.66
A second "hybrid" approach is more complicated. Professor
Eugene Volokh has argued that courts should examine restrictions
separately based on four different categories of justification: (1)
scope, (2) burden, (3) danger reduction, and (4) government as
proprietor.67 Volokh suggests that prohibiting the mentally ill from
possessing firearms may be a valid limitation on the scope of the
right to bear arms68 but is probably not justified for danger
Second Amendment creates, and what regulations legislatures may establish,
were left open.").
63. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2010); see
also Ezell v. City of Chic., 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
64. Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1095, 1137 (2000); see also Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244,
1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (suggesting that heightened scrutiny applied only to
restrictions that amount to a "substantial burden" on the right to bear arms).
65. Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 782-86 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469-70 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673, 680-83 (4th Cir. 2010); Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179,
188 (D.D.C. 2010)).
66. Winkler, supra note 51, at 731 ("[P]ublic safety is already a compelling
government interest."); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)
("[T]he Government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling .... ).
67. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1443, 1443 (2009).
68. Id. at 1510 ("I suspect that those whose judgment is seen as
compromised by mental illness .. . have historically been seen as less than full
rightholders .... But again, some solid historical research would be more
helpful than either scholars' or judges' speculation."). Recall that gun
10 [Vol. 48
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reduction.69 His scope argument is based on the false historical
assumption that limitations on the rights of the mentally ill to bear
arms are "longstanding" (discussed above), so our focus will be
danger reduction. Volokh frames the question as follows: "The real
inquiry is into whether and when a right may be substantially
burdened in order to materially reduce the danger flowing from the
exercise of the right, and into what sort of proof must be given to
show that the substantial restriction will indeed reduce the
danger."70 Volokh suggests some form of exacting scrutiny for
substantial burdens like the mental illness gun ban. 71
In sum, there are no fewer than three potential levels of
constitutional scrutiny, from least to most exacting: reasonableness,
intermediate scrutiny, and Volokh's theory. Part II will apply each
of these three standards to current restrictions on gun possession by
the mentally ill.
II. ARE CURRENT RESTRICTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. Federal and State Bans on Gun Possession by the Mentally Ill
The Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person-who has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or who has been committed to a mental institution" to
purchase or possess a firearm. 72 A person has been adjudicated as a
mental defective if a lawful authority finds that he, "as result of
marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency,
condition or disease: is a danger to himself or to others; or lacks the
mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs." 73 The term
also includes "a finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and
those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by
reason of lack of mental responsibility."74 A person has been
committed to a mental institution if, through a formal hearing, a
legal authority makes the decision to commit the individual.75 This
term includes commitment for mental illness, but it "does not
include a person in a mental institution for observation or a
voluntary admission to a mental institution."76
restrictions on the mentally ill are of recent vintage. See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
69. Volokh, supra note 67, at 1513.
70. Id. at 1461.
71. Id. at 1471-73.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2006).
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The diverse approaches of states to gun possession by the
mentally ill can be reduced to three. Several states have no statute
directly on point.77 Others basically follow the lead of the federal
statute and restrict access to people who have been involuntarily
committed or adjudicated mentally defective.78 Where there is no
state statute or the state statute tracks the federal one, the federal
standard effectively controls. Other states are more restrictive and
prohibit possession or ownership by those who have had any type of
commitment, voluntary or involuntary. 79 A small minority of states
are extremely restrictive and prohibit ownership or possession by
people with mental illness who have no history of commitment.80
For example, Hawaii prohibits gun possession by anyone who "[i]s or
has been diagnosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or
mental disorder ....
These restrictions can be justified, if at all, by the government's
interest in reducing gun injuries and deaths. The causes may
include accidents, aggressive acts, and self-harm. What is the
evidence that the mentally ill pose a higher risk in these areas? Is
there evidence specific to the different categories of the mentally ill
that trigger the firearm ban in different jurisdictions: (1)
involuntarily committed or adjudicated mentally defective; (2)
voluntarily committed; and (3) merely diagnosed as mentally ill?
B. Fit with the Government Interest in Safety
The government obviously has a compelling interest in
preventing firearm deaths. In 2009, there were 554 unintentional
77. For example: Alaska, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, Texas, and Vermont. See Joseph R. Simpson, Bad Risk? An Overview
of Laws Prohibiting Possession of Firearms by Individuals with a History of
Treatment for Mental Illness, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 330, 334-35 tbl.1
(2007).
78. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-103(a) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.065(4)
(West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 724.8(6), 724.31 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.125(D)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105(c)(4)
(West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(1)(b)(vi) (LexisNexis 2008).
79. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448(a)(2) (2007); D.C. CODE § 7-
2502.03(a)(6) (LexisNexis 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129(b)(2)(J) (2011); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-3.1(a)(4) (West 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, §
131(d)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007); State v. Dunham, No. 9812012054, 1999 WL
1223767, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1999) ("[The person's voluntariness is
irrelevant. ... ").
80. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(d) (McKinney 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-6
(2002); In re Mazzone v. Czajka, 777 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dept. 2004) (affirming
revocation of license with diagnosis; no indication of hospitalization).
81. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(c)(3) (2011). Although the facts are not clear,
it appears that only a prohibition this broad would have barred gun sales to the
Aurora, Colorado shooter, James Holmes.
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firearm deaths in the United States.82 By comparison, there were
18,735 gun suicides and 11,493 gun homicides. 83 Avoiding serious
injuries is also a compelling government interest. The following
table summarizes, for 2001, firearm-related deaths and injuries
serious enough to require treatment in hospital emergency
departments 84:
TABLE 1: FATAL AND NONFATAL FIREARM INJURIES,
UNITED STATES: 2001
Fatal Nonfatal
Type Number Rate* Number Rate*
Unintentional 802 0.3 8741 3.1
Assault 11,671 4.1 35,496 12.4
Self-harm 16,869 5.9 2980 **
Undetermined 231 0.1 9480 3.3
* Per 100,000 population.
**Rate not calculated because estimate may have been unstable.
One way to frame the constitutional question is to ask whether
the mentally ill, if their firearm possession were unrestricted, would
disproportionately increase these numbers.
1. Accidents
There are no studies showing that the mentally ill pose an
increased risk of unintentional gun injuries. 85 Particularly given
the relatively low number of accidental firearm fatalities-802 in
2001,86 554 in 2009 87-even the narrow federal restriction on gun
possession by involuntary committees and adjudicated mentally
defectives would likely fail the most lenient "reasonableness"
standard if this were the only justification.
One researcher estimates that more than one million people in
the United States annually are civilly committed for psychiatric
82. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2009, 60 NAT'L
VITAL STAT. REP. 3 tbl.10 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr
Invsr60/nvsr60_.03.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Sara B. Vyrostek et al., Surveillance for Fatal and Nonfatal Injuries-
United States, 2001, 53 MMWR SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1 tbls.6 & 7 (2004),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/SS/SS5307.pdf.
85. Cf. Donald W. Black et al., The Iowa Record-Linkage Study-I. Suicides
and Accidental Deaths Among Psychiatric Patients, 42 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 71, 73-74 (1985) (finding a significant increase in accidental deaths
from undifferentiated causes only during the first year after psychiatric hospital
admission).
86. Vyrostek et al., supra note 84, at 18 tbl.6.
87. Kochanek et al., supra note 82.
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treatment, one-third of which are involuntary commitments.88 Of
course, the total number of individuals barred by federal law from
possessing firearms is much greater than the roughly 333,000
detained each year.89 To deny all Second Amendment rights to such
a large class of individuals in the blind hope of preventing some
fraction of unintentional gun fatalities and other injuries does not
seem reasonable. Without any supporting data, the restriction
seems, in Winkler's words, "so profoundly unfair as to be arbitrary
and irrational."90
2. Violence
The mentally ill are widely perceived as dangerous. Whether
this perception is grounded in reality has been disputed.91 This
Subpart will first summarize the key literature and then will
consider whether the evidence supports current restrictions under
the three possible levels of scrutiny.
a. Literature
In one large study of community residents, Jeffrey Swanson and
his colleagues concluded that 6.81% of people with a serious mental
illness reported violent behavior in the past year as compared with
only 2.05% of people without a major mental disorder. 92 The
diagnoses considered were schizophrenia, major depression, mania
or bipolar disorder, alcohol or drug abuse or dependence, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, panic disorder, and phobia.93 Of particular
interest was the question about use of a weapon, which expressly
included a gun. Weapon use was significantly higher for every
88. Adam J. Falk, Note, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal
Responsibility: The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment After
Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 117, 117 & n.3 (1999) (citing Mary L.
Durham, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Research, Policy and Practice, in
MENTAL HEALTH AND LAw 17, 17 (Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds., 1996)).
89. One researcher has more recently suggested that the actual figure may
be double: "[Als many as 660,000 patients per year may be subject to
involuntary commitment." BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 3 (2005).
90. Winkler, supra note 51, at 723.
91. Eric Silver, Understanding the Relationship Between Mental Disorder
and Violence: The Need for a Criminological Perspective, 30 L. & HuM. BEHAV.
685, 685-86 (2006).
92. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the
Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41
Hosp. & COMM. PSYCH. 761, 767 fig.1 (1990). An elaboration of this research
appears in Jeffrey W. Swanson, Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and
Community Violence: An Epidemiological Approach, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL
DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 101 (John Monahan & Henry J.
Steadman eds., 1994).
93. See Swanson et al., supra note 92, at 763.
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diagnosis except mania or bipolar disorder where the N was only 30
and none had wielded a weapon.94 Of the non-substance abuse
disorders, schizophrenia had the highest weapon use: 8.58% as
compared with 0.40% of individuals without a disorder.95
A second study, by Bruce Link and his colleagues, of mental
patients reported assaultive weapon use in the past five years for
2.7% of never-treated community residents, 2.1% for first-contact
patients, 12.9% for repeat-contact patients (p<0.01), and 11.1% for
former patients (p<0.05).96  These effects remained statistically
significant after controlling for age, sex, education, race, ethnicity,
need-for-approval scale, and homicide rate in the community, 97 but
lost significance after controlling for psychotic symptoms.98 This
strongly suggests that a subset of the mentally ill with psychotic
symptoms may account for the higher-observed overall levels of
violence, including weapon use.
Supporting the role of psychosis is a recent meta-analysis by
Seena Fazel and his colleagues of violence studies involving
schizophrenia and other psychoses. 99 The researchers found that
such patients were roughly twice as likely to engage in violent
behavior as control groups.100 Summarizing five studies, the meta-
analysis found that schizophrenics were almost twenty times more
likely to commit homicide. 101
State firearm bans are not limited to the acutely, or even
potentially, psychotic. Again, the key trigger for a firearm ban in
most places is commitment to an inpatient facility. That is why a
94. Id. at 768 tbl.6.
95. Id.
96. Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental
Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. Soc. REV. 275, 283 tbl.1 (1992). The link between
use of mental health services, presumably in part a proxy for severity of illness,
was confirmed by Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Psychotic Symptoms and Disorders
and the Risk of Violent Behavior in the Community, 6 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL
HEALTH 309, 314, 319 tbl.1 (1996) (finding significantly elevated levels of
violence among individuals ever hospitalized or otherwise using mental health
services in the past six months).
97. Link et al., supra note 96, at 287 tbl.4.
98. Id. at 288 tbl.5; accord Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, Psychotic
Symptoms and the Violent/Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Compared to
Community Controls, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN
RISK ASSESSMENT 137, 154 tbl.7 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds.,
1994); see also Swanson et al., supra note 96, at 320 tbl.2 (finding significantly
increased violence among those with psychotic symptoms).
99. See generally Seena Fazel et al., Schizophrenia and Violence:
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 6 PLOS MED. 1 (2009), available at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371
%2Fjournal.pmed.1000120.
100. Id. at 4 fig.2 (2.1 odds ratio, eleven studies). With substance abuse
comorbidity, the odds ratio jumps to 8.9. Id. at 5 fig.3.
101. Id. at 12 fig.9.
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study funded by the MacArthur Foundation and published in 1998
is so important: it compared "civil admission" patients discharged
from acute psychiatric facilities with a control group living in the
same neighborhood. 102 It concluded that, among non-substance
abusers, the prevalence of violence by patients was no higher than
by neighbors. 103 The study also showed that, among acts of violence,
actual or threatened weapon use was significantly less likely among
patients.104
The exclusion of substance abusers was important. When they
were included, there was a significantly higher prevalence of
violence among patients (11.5% in first follow-up period) than
among the control group (4.6%; p<0.05). 105 As the authors of the
MacArthur study later conceded: "Mental disorder has a significant
effect on violence by increasing people's susceptibility to substance
abuse." 06
b. Applying the Standards
The three standards are (1) reasonableness, (2) intermediate
scrutiny, and (3) the Volokh approach. Even the most restrictive
state statute would almost certainly survive reasonableness review.
Hawaii proscribes gun possession by anyone ever diagnosed with a
mental illness.107 One need look no further than the first study
above, by Swanson and his colleagues, for a sufficient basis for this
proscription.108 Nearly 7% of people with a serious mental illness
reported violent behavior as compared with 2% of those without.109
102. Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute
Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 394 (1998).
103. Id. at 393, 399 tbl.5; see also Virginia Aldig6 Hiday, Dangerousness of
Civil Commitment Candidates: A Six-Month Follow-Up, 14 L. & HUMAN BEHAV.
551, 562 (1990) ("Following a large sample in one state through arrest records,
patient ward charts, hospital admission evaluations, civil commitment
affidavits, and mental health center patient records, and using objective
behavioral indicators, we found that civil commitment candidates do not tend to
be dangerous, much less violent, within the 6 months following their court
hearings."). But see Swanson, supra note 92, at 111 ("Major mental disorder
without alcohol or drug abuse complications emerged as a quite rare condition
in the community, yet one that was significantly more common among persons
who reported that they had committed assaultive acts.").
104. See Steadman et al., supra note 102, at 400 tbl.6 (revealing 22.3% for
patients; 42.3% for community).
105. Id. at 399 tbl.5.
106. John Monahan et al., The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study
Revisited: Two Views Ten Years After Its Initial Publication, 59 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 147, 149 (2008).
107. HAw. REV. STAT. § 134-7 (2011).
108. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
109. Swanson et al., supra note 92.
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One slippage here is the word "serious." Many common
diagnoses were omitted from the Swanson study but are nonetheless
disqualifying.110 A second missing link is harmful use of a firearm,
as opposed to violence of any kind. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly
unlikely that a court would conclude that the Hawaii legislature
acted "arbitrarily" or "irrationally" in lumping all mental illness
together or in assuming that gun violence is positively correlated
with overall violence.
State courts applying the reasonableness standard have upheld
similar laws. The Court of Appeals of Oregon held as reasonable a
statute providing for an individualized determination that a
mentally ill person was too dangerous to possess firearms."1 And
the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a much broader restriction,
explaining that "[i]t is clearly reasonable for the legislature to
regulate the possession of firearms by those who are under the
influence of alcohol or drugs."112
In contrast, applying intermediate scrutiny to existing law
would generate uncertainty. Commentators are split on this
issue."13 The narrowest restriction is the federal one barring gun
possession by involuntary committees and those adjudicated
mentally defective.114 The MacArthur study found a significant,
double risk of violence for released inpatients. In combination with
the higher rates of violence associated with mental illness in the
other studies, most courts would likely conclude that the federal
restriction is substantially related to the important government
interest in curbing gun violence." 5
But there is a serious problem of overbreadth. Excluding
substance abusers eliminated the effect observed in the MacArthur
study. The other studies suggest that only the seriously mentally ill
or those with psychosis are more violent. There is no clear answer
as to the degree of overinclusiveness that will be tolerated under
110. See, e.g., Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset
Distributions of DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication, 62 ARCHIVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 593, 596 tbl.2 (2005) (reporting
lifetime prevalence rates of 9.5%, 8.1%, and 6.8%, respectively, for conduct
disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and posttraumatic stress
disorder, none of which were included in the Swanson study).
111. State v. Owenby, 826 P.2d 51, 53 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
112. People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d 228, 230 (Colo. 1979).
113. Compare Kiehl, supra note 47, at 1160, and Winkler, supra note 51, at
688-89, 722, with Volokh, supra note 67, at 1463-64.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2006).
115. It could go without saying, but the federal law would no doubt be held
"reasonable." One probably would need to look no further than the usual




intermediate scrutiny.116 Even if facial challenges to the federal
restriction fail, there may be winning as-applied challenges by
mentally ill individuals without comorbid substance abuse or only
mild or moderate symptoms, not including psychosis." 7
Even if known low-risk groups were excluded from the ban,
there would still be massive overbreadth. Schizophrenia is a serious
mental illness typically accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions.118  Suppose the firearm ban were targeted at just
schizophrenics. Fazel reported a nearly twenty-fold increased risk
of homicide by schizophrenics.119 Of course, not every homicide
involves a firearm. Still, the number is quite close to Swanson's
finding of a roughly twenty-one times higher rate of weapon use by
schizophrenics.1 20
Prohibiting firearm possession by schizophrenics would
certainly seem to be substantially related to reducing firearm
homicide. But the base rates for homicide and homicide with a
firearm are very low. As a result, even a well-substantiated policy
sweeps quite broadly.121 Based on the United States population,122
lifetime prevalence of schizophrenia,12 3 and rate of assaultive
firearm deaths,124 I estimate that, each year, roughly 1500
schizophrenics who would commit no deadly firearm assault would
116. See Volokh, supra note 67, at 1470-71 n.109 (suggesting the felon-in-
possession ban fails intermediate scrutiny because it covers nonviolent felons).
117. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Gary Kleck, Policy Lessons from Recent Gun Control Research, 49 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 42 (1986) ("[V]iolence potential above the minimal level
characterizing the general public is limited to a small, identifiable minority of
mentally ill persons.").
118. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 312 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) (listing delusions and hallucinations
among schizophrenia's characteristic symptoms). Furthermore, nearly fifty
percent of schizophrenics have lifetime substance abuse comorbidity. Peter F.
Buckley et al., Psychiatric Comorbidities and Schizophrenia, 35 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 383, 394 (2009).
119. Fazel et al., supra note 99, at 12 fig.9.
120. Swanson et al., supra note 92, at 768 tbl.6.
121. See Marilyn Price & Donna M. Norris, National Instant Criminal
Background Check Improvement Act: Implications for Persons with Mental
Illness, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 123, 128 (2008) ("Even if the persons
with mental illness who are part of the prohibited class are truly at increased
risk, can the legislation actually decrease the suicide and homicide rates, and at
what cost?").
122. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, State & Country QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2013) (estimating a national population of 308,745,538 people as of April 2010).
123. Samuel J. Keith et al., Schizophrenic Disorders, in PSYCHIATRIC
DISORDERS IN AMERICA: THE EPIDEMIOLOGIC CATCHMENT AREA STUDY 33, 37 tbl.3-
2 (Lee N. Robins & Darrel A. Regier eds., 1991) (noting a 1.4% prevalence of
schizophrenia among the household population).
124. See supra Part II.B.
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be denied their constitutional right to bear arms for every one life
saved.125 Adding serious gun injuries avoided, the number would
drop to around 400. Deciding whether that relationship is
substantial enough necessarily requires an uncertain balancing of
interests.12 6
The Volokh approach suffers on its face from much the same
indeterminacy as intermediate scrutiny. In some sense, it is
heightened scrutiny along a sliding scale. As to mental illness
restrictions, however, Volokh is clear: "I don't think that any class of
mentally competent adults should be denied constitutional rights
based on their demographic characteristics, as opposed to things
they have personally done."12 7 No quantum of statistical evidence,
even the strong schizophrenia findings (or suicide numbers below),
would seem sufficient under Volokh's approach to justify a ban on
firearm possession.
3. Suicide
A majority of suicides are committed with a firearm.128 People
without access to a gun are less likely to kill themselves, or others,
with a gun.129 Importantly, not having a gun appears to deter a
substantial number of suicide attempts altogether, rather than
simply steering the victim to alternative meanS130:
125. If the increased risk were two instead of twenty times-as the broader
studies suggest-the 1500 figure would jump to 12,000. See Bruce G. Link &
Ann Stueve, New Evidence on the Violence Risk Posed by People With Mental
Illness, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 403, 403 (1998) ("Furthermore, because
serious mental illness is relatively rare and the excess risk modest, the
contribution of mental illness to overall levels of violence in our society is
minuscule."); cf. GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 345
(1991) ("If only a few percent of gun owners will ever use their guns to commit
an unlawful violent act, broad-based controls are highly inefficient. A hundred
people must be disarmed in the hopes of preventing two or three from doing
violence with a gun.").
126. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American
Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 853 (2011).
Underinclusiveness is generally not viewed as constitutionally problematic.
127. Volokh, supra note 67, at 1513.
128. WISQARS Fatal Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999-2010,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb
/ncipc/mortratel0_us.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (choose "Suicide" and
"Firearm"; then choose "Suicide" and "Non-Firearm").
129. Linda L. Dahlberg et al., Guns in the Home and Risk of a Violent Death
in the Home: Findings from a National Study, 160 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 929,
934 tbl.4 (2004); Matthew Miller et al., Household Firearm Ownership and
Rates of Suicide Across the 50 United States, 62 J. TRAUMA 1029, 1031, 1033
(2007).
130. Matthew Miller & David Hemenway, Guns and Suicide in the United
States, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 989, 990 tbl. (2008); see also Miller et al., supra
note 129, at 1031 tbl.1.
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TABLE 2: SUICIDES BY STATE GUN OWNERSHIP, 2001-2005
Variable High Gun Low Gun
Ownership Ownership
States States
Person-years 195 million 200 million
Households with guns 47% 15%
Number of firearm 16,577 4257
suicides
Number of nonfirearm 9172 9259
suicides
Total number of suicides 25,749 13,516
The dramatically lower number of total suicides in low gun
ownership states makes more sense in light of two additional facts:
(1) "one third to four fifths of all suicide attempts ... are
impulsive,"131 and (2) "more than 90% of people who survive a
suicide attempt ... do not go on to die by suicide." 132  Whether
firearm restrictions effectively curb access and reduce total suicides
is disputed, 133 but the federal background check system prevented
87,474 gun sales in 2007 alone.134 The ultimate policy question,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article, which is only concerned
with the constitutionality of the current gun laws.
131. Miller & Hemenway, supra note 130, at 989.
132. Id.
133. Compare Deborah Azrael, Cook and Ludwig's Principles for Effective
Gun Policy: An Extension to Suicide Prevention, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 615, 618
(2004) ("[P]olicies that reduce access to guns are likely to be associated with
reduced [suicide] mortality. . . ."), and J. John Mann et al., Suicide Prevention
Strategies: A Systematic Review, 294 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2064, 2070 (2005)
("Suicides by [firearms among U.S. men] have decreased after firearm control
legislation."), with KLECK, supra note 125, at 255 ("On the whole, previous
studies failed to make a solid case for the ability of gun controls to reduce the
total suicide rate."), and Price & Norris, supra note 121 ("There are few data
showing that limiting legal firearm access to persons with mental illness as
defined by the Brady Act will in fact have an effect on suicide and homicide
rates using firearms."). However, even a skeptic concedes that "gun controls
might still reduce suicide by reducing gun ownership levels among depressed
and other suicide-prone segments of the population," KLECK, supra note 125, at
256; accord Joseph R. Simpson, Issues Related to Possession of Firearms by
Individuals with Mental Illness: An Overview Using California as an Example,
13 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 109, 114 (2007), a possibility supported by the
relatively low gun ownership rates observed among psychiatric inpatients. Dale
E. McNiel et al., Base Rates of Firearm Possession by Hospitalized Psychiatric
Patients, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 551, 552 (2007) (noting that only 9 out of 100
acknowledged either owning or having access to a gun).
134. Letter from Thomas E. Bush, III, Assistant Dir. CJIS Div., Dep't of
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Ninety percent (or more) of suicide victims in the United States
suffered from mental illness 35 (estimates from England are
consistent with this figure,136 and globally the level may be even
higher 37). In contrast, lifetime prevalence in the United States of
any mental disorder has been estimated at 46%.138 These figures
imply that the mentally ill are over ten times more likely to commit
suicide.
Another way to estimate the increased risk is to directly
compare the suicide rates for the mentally ill with the overall rate.
One review article estimated the lifetime risk for suicide at 6% for
affective or mood disorder, 7% for alcohol dependence, and 4% for
schizophrenia.139  A more recent reexamination put the
schizophrenia number at 4.9%.140 By way of comparison, the overall
yearly suicide rate was 1.2 per 10,000 people in 2009.141
A thorough meta-analysis of published papers found a suicide
risk for individuals with any psychiatric diagnosis in any treatment
setting eleven times that of individuals without any diagnosis. 142
The meta-analysis also examined diagnoses separately and
concluded that "[i]f these results can be generalized, then virtually
all mental disorders have an increased risk of suicide excepting
mental retardation and possibly dementia and agoraphobia." 1 4 3
Data on suicide attempts generally confirm this result.144
135. Yeats Conwell et al., Relationships of Age and Axis I Diagnoses in
Victims of Completed Suicide: A Psychological Autopsy Study, 153 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1003 (1996) (finding an exact rate of 90.1%); Charles L. Rich
et al., San Diego Suicide Study: I. Young vs Old Subjects, 43 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 577, 579 tbl.5 (1986) (finding an exact rate of 93.1%).
136. Elizabeth King, Suicide in the Mentally Ill: An Epidemiological Sample
and Implications for Clinicians, 165 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 658, 659 (1994).
137. Jos6 Manoel Bertolote et al., Psychiatric Diagnoses and Suicide:
Revisiting the Evidence, 25 CRISIs 147, 147 (2004) (finding an exact rate of 98%).
138. Kessler et al., supra note 110 (reporting 46.4% lifetime prevalence of
any mental disorder, the overwhelming majority of which were axis-I under
DSM-IV-TR). See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 118, at 28
(providing examples of the major groups of clinical disorders included in axis-I).
139. Hazel M. Inskip et al., Lifetime Risk of Suicide for Affective Disorder,
Alcoholism and Schizophrenia, 172 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 35, 35 (1998).
140. Brian A. Palmer et al., The Lifetime Risk of Suicide in Schizophrenia: A
Reexamination, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 247, 247 (2005).
141. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2009, 60 NAT'L
VITAL STAT. REP., no. 3, 2011, at 1, 5 tbl.B, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_03.pdf.
142. E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for
Mental Illness: A Meta-Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 221 tbl.14h
(1997).
143. Id. at 222.
144. Kessler et al., supra note 110, at 623 tbl.2; cf. Guilherme Borges et al.,
Twelve-Month Prevalence of and Risk Factors for Suicide Attempts in the World
Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys, 71 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
1617, 1625 (2010) ("[A]lthough the presence of a DSM-IV mental disorder was
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How do current laws fare under the three standards if
preventing suicide is the goal? Given the much higher rate of
suicide among virtually all mental illnesses, it is difficult to imagine
any court striking down as "unreasonable" even the broadest
restriction on gun possession by the mentally ill.145 But what about
intermediate scrutiny? Courts would probably reach the same
result, but, as with harm to others, the connection to suicide
prevention may not qualify as a sufficiently substantial relationship
in some judges' eyes.
To see this more clearly, focus again on the narrow, federal
restriction. Here, the evidence of a higher suicide risk gets even
stronger. The meta-analysis described above also examined
released involuntary committees and found a suicide risk thirty-nine
times greater than expected. 146 Taking the high yearly estimate
above of 660,000 involuntary committees as an approximation for
the number of people who have ever been civilly committed, 147 the
federal restriction denies gun rights to about 450 former patients
who would not use a firearm to commit suicide for every gun suicide
it prevents. Assuming instead for illustration that three million
people have ever been involuntarily committed, the ratio increases
to about 575. The case for constitutionality of current laws is
certainly stronger when the rationale is suicide prevention, but, as
with violence, it ultimately comes down to balancing.148
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Heller stated that all Americans have a
right to keep and bear arms but suggested in dicta that current
restrictions on the mentally ill exercising that right are
"presumptively lawful." All but the Seventh Circuit have apparently
reconciled these statements simply by dropping the word
associated with significantly higher odds of experiencing suicide ideation in
virtually every instance, few mental disorders predicted suicide attempts
among those with ideation."). Although these correlations are compelling, the
suicide studies generally lack a control group, so causation is uncertain. But
strong correlation even without causation is almost certainly sufficient for
reasonableness and probably for intermediate scrutiny.
145. Jeffrey Swanson & Allison R. Gilbert, Mental Illness and Firearm
Violence, Letter to the Editor, 306 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 930, 930 (2011) ("Suicide
prevention may be an area of convergence between laws focused on guns and
laws focused on individuals who should not have them.").
146. Harris & Barraclough, supra note 142, at 219 tbl.14b, 220; see also
Donald W. Black et al., supra note 85, at 72 (providing data demonstrating that
women display almost three times the risk of death by suicide than men).
147. And assuming that involuntary commitment does not affect the
percentage of suicides by firearm as opposed to by other means.
148. Again, Volokh's hybrid approach would apparently strike down such
status restrictions in all cases.
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"presumptively." That reading of Heller is unsatisfactory. The
Second Amendment protects the mentally ill. The interesting
question is the extent of that protection. This Article finds support
for three possible constitutional standards for restrictions on the
gun rights of the mentally ill: (1) reasonableness, (2) intermediate
scrutiny, and (3) a hybrid.
Current restrictions are tested against these three standards.
Federal law prohibits firearm possession by, principally, individuals
who have been involuntarily committed. Some state laws are more
restrictive, and a few ban gun possession by anyone with a mental
illness. All of the restrictions would likely be deemed reasonable.
Intermediate scrutiny poses a closer question. The broadest
restrictions would likely have to be justified on grounds of suicide,
not violence, prevention. Notwithstanding high-profile events like
the Aurora, Colorado shooting, the statistical relationship to
preventing violence is arguably not substantial. On the other hand,
suicide risk is substantially increased for basically all diagnoses.
The particular hybrid approach considered here would strike down
all status-based restrictions.
Several core findings emerge. First, despite Heller's dictum, it
is an open question as to which standard applies to restrictions on
gun possession by the mentally ill. Second, the choice of standard
may very well be dispositive with respect to current firearm
regulations. Third, particularly if intermediate scrutiny controls, a
reexamination of the rationale for our gun laws is required. An
undifferentiated and unsubstantiated fear that all persons with
mental illness pose a grave threat to others will not suffice. This
lowest common denominator of stigma may ultimately explain the
common cause of politicians, the Brady Campaign, and the NRA to
disarm the mentally ill. But the stronger, and probably
constitutionally adequate, rationale is suicide prevention.
Preventing suicide may seem a less powerful goal than
preventing violence against others. It is not. First, most courts
have held that preventing suicide is a "compelling" government
interest.149 The United States Supreme Court has suggested that,
even in the context of the terminally ill, it is "unquestionably
important."150 Second, preventing suicide by the mentally ill falls
149. E.g., Grand Jury Subpoena, John Doe v. United States, 150 F.3d 170,
172 (2d Cir. 1998); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 103 (Fla. 1997); Final Exit
Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722, 724 (Ga. 2012); McNabb v. Dep't of
Corr., 180 P.3d 1257, 1266 (Wash. 2008).
150. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). Even critics of
Glucksberg agree. See id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I
agree that the State has a compelling interest in preventing persons from
committing suicide because of depression or coercion by third parties."); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L.
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within the government's traditional parens patriae power, a "well-
established exception[] to a broad general presumption of individual
liberty in the liberal society."' 5 ' If the prospect of self-harm is a
sufficient basis for involuntary civil commitment (and it iS152), it
should equally suffice to justify a loss of gun possession rights.
Finally, the public already recognizes that schizophrenics,
individuals suffering from major depression, and alcohol dependents
pose greater risks to themselves than to others.153 To be sure,
violence creates fear whereas suicide does not, but saving lives
should be more important than calming nerves.
REV. 1501, 1510 (2008) (conceding that the state "obviously ... has an interest
in preventing suicide").
151. Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment and Sexual Predators: Competence
and Condemnation, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 323, 333 (1998).
152. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). For an argument that it
should not be, see Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 137,
144-45 (1996).
153. Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., 'A Disease Like Any Other'? A Decade of
Change in Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol
Dependence, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1321, 1324 tbl.1 (2010).
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